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On the normative implications of social 
neuroscience1
Sobre las implicaciones normativas de la neurociencia social
arleen salles
centro de investigaciones filosóficas - buenos aires
Resumen
En las últimas décadas, la neurociencia y la psicología cognitiva nos ha permitido comenzar a 
entender la relación entre procesos psicológicos diversos y hasta sobre las bases neurológicas de las 
creencias, las emociones, los juicios y las decisiones morales. 
Pese a la aceptada distinción entre el carácter descriptivo de la ciencia y el normativo de la mora-
lidad, algunos autores afirman que los resultados de los estudios neurocientíficos tienen implicaciones 
normativas. No es claro, sin embargo, qué significa esta afirmación, y no existe consenso al respecto. 
En este trabajo, identifico tres interpretaciones sobre las implicaciones o estatus normativo de la 
neurociencia. La primera se concentra en el papel que la neurociencia puede cumplir en explicarnos el 
origen de la moralidad y de los valores morales. La segunda interpretación apunta a mostrar que el co-
nocimiento neurocientifico puede demostrar cuan plausible es la psicología moral que algunos enfoques 
éticos presuponen. Finalmente, una tercera interpretación sugiere que la neurociencia puede cumplir 
un papel más fuerte, determinando la plausibilidad moral de algunos enfoques éticos. Mi objeto es 
delinear cada interpretación y los temas que plantea. Sugiero es razonable aceptar que la neurociencia 
nos puede brindar conocimiento útil sobre la naturaleza del razonamiento moral, pero por el momen-
to, su contribución se limita a eso. 
Palabras clave: psicología cognitiva, normatividad, juicio moral, decisión moral.
Abstract
Within the last decades, brain science has been offering new insights into the relationship among 
diverse psychological processes and the neural correlates of our moral thought and behavior. Despite 
the distinction between the explanatory/descriptive nature of science and the normative nature of 
morality, some neuroethicists have claimed that neuroscientific findings have normative implications. 
In this paper, I identify three interpretations of this claim.
The first focuses on neuroscience’s role in explaining the origin of morality and of moral values and how 
neurobiology is the bases of moral behavior. A second version is about the role that neuroscientific 
knowledge can play in showing the psychological plausibility of the moral psychology underlying some 
1  Earlier drafts of  this article were presented at Centro de Investigaciones Filosóficas and at the annual meeting 
of  the American society for Bioethics and the Humanities, Washington DC, October 2012. I am grateful for 
the comments made in discussion there. I also want to thank Kathinka Evers, Inmaculada de Melo Martin and 
Maria Julia Bertomeu for helpful comments. I would also like to acknowledge the Argentine Agency for Scientific 
Advancement for their financial support of  this project. 
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ethical approaches. Finally, a third version advances that neuroscience could play a role in determining 
the moral plausibility of some normative approaches. 
My aim is to delineate each version and highlight the issues raised to suggest that while neuro-
science might provide information regarding the nature of moral reasoning, its role in the norma-
tive discussion itself is still quite limited.
Keywords: neuroethics, cognitive psychology, normativity, moral judgement, moral decision.
1. Introduction
Within the last decades, brain science has been offering new insights into the 
relationship among diverse psychological processes and the neural correlates of 
our moral thought and social behavior. Although there is still much to be known 
about the brain and its multitasking nature, 2 lately a group of philosophers have 
claimed that the increased understanding of the neural and psychological processes 
involved in moral decision-making and moral thinking in general has normative 
significance. Yet, a review of the relevant literature shows that the surge of interest 
on the relationship between empirical studies and moral philosophy has not been 
accompanied by a convergence on how to understand the normative implications 
of neuroscience. In this paper, I identify three interpretations of the claim about the 
normative import of neuroscience.
The first interpretation focuses on neuroscience’s role in explaining the origin of 
morality and of moral values and telling us how neurobiology grounds moral behavior. 
The second interpretation is about the role that neuroscientific knowledge can play 
in showing the psychological plausibility of the moral psychology presupposed by mo-
rality in general or specific ethical approaches in particular. Finally, a third interpre-
tation suggests that neuroscience might actually play a crucial role in the normative 
discussion itself, sometimes even helping to determine the moral plausibility of some 
normative approaches.3 
My aim in this paper is to separate and explain each of the different interpreta-
tions of the claim about the normative implications of neuroscience and what the 
authors think that follows from their version of the claim. I think that in most cases, 
each interpretation of the claim (as presented by the authors) can be challenged on 
the grounds of one of the following: a- the supporting evidence is not compelling 
enough, b- the existing evidence is compelling, but insufficient, or c- the evidence 
is compelling and sufficient but it supports a conclusion that is philosophically less 
2  Current evidence strongly suggests that the neural substrates for moral thinking include a number of  brain 
structures. There is consensus in that there is no moral center, different brain areas are activated in different ways. 
(Damasio, 1995; Greene and Haidt, 2002).
3  There is also an interesting controversy over whether the rise of  neuroscience can not only shape but even un-
dermine some foundational ethical concepts, for example, the concepts of  personhood and autonomy (Farah and 
Heberlein, 2006; Kaposy 2010). I do not focus on these issues here. 
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interesting. Ultimately, I want to say that while neuroscience can give us important 
information regarding the nature of moral reasoning and morality, its normative 
import is still quite limited.
2. On neuroscience and moral philosophy
Since a richer understanding of how the brain works morally has been typically 
accompanied by the claim that such understanding has implications on ethical 
theory, it is legitimate to ask exactly what is at stake. 
In general, the aims of moral philosophy are different from the explanatory 
aims of science. Science aims at explaining and describing the way things are. In 
the case of social neuroscience, its primary objective is to understand and analyze 
how humans think and know socially and morally, and how they judge accordingly. 
Neuroscientists generally do not have as a goal the creation of a moral philosophy 
based on science (Changeux et al., 2005; Damasio, 2007). 4 However, because social 
neuroscience is interested in understanding moral cognition and judgment, it often 
focuses on normative claims and studies them, trying to discover, for example, what 
brain process is involved when people make certain normative judgments, or what 
are the neural bases of some moral intuitions. But this examination in itself does 
not need to lead neuroscientists to metaethical claims (for example, about whether 
there are moral facts or whether moral judgments can be true or false) or normative 
moral conclusions. 
What is a normative conclusion? Although it may be difficult to provide a 
definition of the notion of normativity, in one obvious sense «normative» is 
precisely contrasted with «descriptive». That morality is normative means that it 
does not describe what human beings do but rather prescribes what they ought to 
do; talk about normative conclusions is talk about some kind of oughtness, about 
how people should judge or think or act. 
Despite the distinction between the explanatory/descriptive and we could even 
say ideally morally detached nature of science and the normative nature of morality, 
a review of the neuroethical literature shows an increased sympathy for the idea 
that neuroscientific findings have some kind of normative implication. It is worth 
noting, however, that many of those who argue for this at the same time assert that 
their claim that neuroscience has ethical implications does not commit them to the 
view that neuroscience can determine what people ought to do (Evers 2010; Greene 
2008, 2003; Churchland, 2008). That is, they take pains to avoid what is known as 
4  For a different view see Michael Gazzaniga, who states “I would like to support the idea that there could be a 
universal set of  biological responses to moral dilemmas, a sort of  ethics, built into our brains. My hope is that we 
soon may be able to uncover those ethics, identify them, and begin to live more fully by them” (Gazzaniga, 2005). 
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the naturalistic fallacy, the invalid transition from claims about how things are to 
claims about how they ought to be.5 So what do they mean when they make the 
claim about the normative implications of neuroscience? I believe that in order to 
evaluate the legitimacy of their claim it is important to identify three ways in which 
it can be interpreted.
3. Interpretation I: Neuroscience and the Origins of Morality
One first interpretation of the claim that neuroscience has some kind of 
normative implication revolves around the idea that neuroscience gives us the 
kind of neurobiological knowledge necessary to understand human beings’ moral 
condition, how people acquired moral concepts and why they formulated normative 
systems. Advocates of this view believe that the possession of such knowledge 
would allow us to ask the appropriate ethical questions and plan the most efficient 
methods to achieve our moral goals (Damasio 2007). The underlying assumption is 
that since specific brain systems and genes underlie behaviors that are considered 
moral, knowledge of what those are and of how they work allows us to inform the 
ethical discussion.
The work of philosopher Kathinka Evers illustrates this view. In a recent book, 
Evers draws on the work of neuroscientists Joseph Ledoux, Jean Pierre Changeux, 
and Gerald Edelman to give a neurobiological explanation of the nature and 
development of moral thought and of the human tendency to construct normative 
systems. For Evers, the brain is an «autonomously active, plastic, projective» and 
highly selective organ, necessarily and fundamentally constrained by values and 
emotions that in turn make it sensible to reward signals and learning (Evers 2010: 
114). Human beings are «born evaluators», Evers says, neurobiologically predisposed 
to develop a system of values that facilitate navigation of their social, cultural and 
moral environments. Indeed, these values (understood as factors relevant in 
decision-making that shape choices and decisions) are rooted on neurobiological 
predispositions (such as self-interest, control-orientation, dissociation, and selective 
sympathy) that constitute the human identity. For Evers, moral theory can be 
explained as the attempt to manage the social distinctions that humans make 
between themselves and others and the hierarchies that they establish, source both 
of interpersonal relations and of conflicts. 
For Evers, the normative implications of this knowledge are clear (Evers, 2010: 
144). Insofar as neuroscience can provide a neurobiological diagnosis of the human 
condition, it can play an important practical role in the construction of meaningful 
5  And yet, in a recent book, Patricia Churchland criticizes the idea that values are beyond science and appears to be 
quite skeptical about the putative autonomy of  morality.
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social structures and implementation of moral norms. She thinks that the evidence 
supports the view that human beings are «empathetic xenophobes», that is, 
«empathetic by virtue of our intelligence towards a relatively wide range of creatures, 
but far more narrowly and selectively sympathetic to the closer group …whereas 
we tend to remain indifferent or antipathetic to everyone else». (Evers 2010: 132) 
Thus, recognition of this fact should allow humans to articulate solutions to social 
problems and promote the development of the kind of societies they want. 6 That 
is, neurobiological knowledge can inform the articulation of our social goals and 
aspirations, hopefully increasing our awareness of the need for stable and realistic 
social structures and agreements. 
Evers avoids over-interpreting her view: by talking about the normative 
implications of neuroscience, she means to make the point that human abilities to 
judge and act morally and formulate normative systems has a history and that this is 
linked to neurobiological mechanisms with which human beings are equipped. 7 But 
she does not believe that only neuroscience can give us moral knowledge nor does 
she suggest that neurobiological knowledge can actually settle moral questions or 
provide normative guidance. This means that recognizing human’s neurobiological 
identity and understanding the impact this awareness can have on the type of 
society we build does not entail that the resulting society is necessarily good or 
morally desirable. Norms have to do with regulating people’s actions: the normative 
discussion regarding what is good and desirable from a moral standpoint is still 
open and it is independent from neurobiological facts. In this sense, Evers’ view 
does not threaten moral philosophy, nor does it demand that moral philosophers 
abandon ethics. For her, neuroscience plays a complementary role. This makes 
her claim about the normative force of neuroscience easier to accept, but also less 
philosophically challenging. 
A much stronger version of the claim that neuroscience is morally relevant is 
found in the work of philosopher Patricia Churchland. At times she suggests a 
simply «informative» role for neuroscience, stating that neuroscience’s contribution 
to ethics is related to the knowledge it can provide regarding the intricate neural 
circuitry and the hormones that manage attachment and trust (Churchland, 2011). 
Drawing on a number of studies and including evidence from endocrinology, 
Churchland argues that morality originates in the neurobiology of attachment and 
bonding. By attachment she understands a group of dispositions to extend care 
to others, form bonds with others and develop trust. She emphasizes the role of 
6  For Evers, this does not mean that social forces are not relevant to the shaping of  moral norms, nor does it entail 
negating the importance of  free will.
7  The controversial aspect of  Evers’ view does not have to do with the role she gives to neuroscience. What some 
might consider controversial is her largely negative conception of  the human neurobiological identity. However, 
an examination of  this topic is beyond the scope of  this paper.
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oxytocin8 (whose main purpose is to strengthen the mother-infant bond) and its 
significant spillover effect that makes empathy ultimately include distant relatives 
and other members of the in-group. From there, culture starts playing a role, 
shaping moral systems and institutional structures that in turn enforce norms and 
rules among strangers who can’t be expected to automatically feel empathy towards 
others. For Churchland, «a deeper understanding of what it is that makes humans 
and other animals social, and what it is that disposes us to care about others, may 
lead to greater understanding of how to cope with social problems» (Churchland, 
2011: 4).
And yet, Churchland seems to think that neuroscience plays a more fundamental 
role. For her, most practical problems are «constraint satisfaction problems» where 
a number of more or less relevant considerations are brought to bear in making a 
decision and where deductive logic plays no role (Churchland, 2011: 7). In turn, 
«[values] are at the same time facts that give substance to the process of figuring 
out what to do-facts such as that our children matter to us, and that we care about 
their well-being; that we care about our clan. Relative to these values some solutions 
are better than others, as a matter of fact; relative to these values, practical policy 
decisions can be negotiated» (Churchland, 2011: 8-9). Churchland believes that 
when this is taken into account, it becomes evident that some solutions are better 
than others.
But are those solutions morally better? And how do we determine this? Not 
through philosophical analysis. Churchland specifically rejects philosophers’ 
normative project, which she believes does more harm than good insofar as it 
involves articulating and defending principles and norms when in fact morality is 
more to be seen as a practice similar to what we do naturally when trying to navigate 
our social world (Churchland, 2011: 186). Her suggestion is that understanding the 
neural underpinning of habits and emotions could settle the issue. 
The problem is that the view that morality ought to be based on trust and 
attachment does not depend on understanding the brain and the cognitive and 
affective mechanisms involved in moral reasoning. The issue of the moral value of 
trust and attachment is philosophical, not scientific. And yet, Churchland’s focus 
on neural mechanisms and biology suggests that they can offer a solution to moral 
problems.9 But it is not clear in her account how knowledge of what happens in 
the brain can actually be instrumental in determining the moral value of some traits. 
This casts doubt on the suggestion that neuroscience can have this kind of moral 
import.
8  Along with other hormones. (Churchland, 2011: 31). Although it is true that oxytocin is considered an “attachment 
hormone” it plays other roles.
9  Thus disregarding the distinction between the grounding of  and the justification of  morality. For an analysis of  
this point see Cortina, 2011.
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4. Interpretation II: Neuroscience and Moral Psychology
A second version of the claim about the normative import of neuroscience 
revolves around the idea that empirical research might allows us to uncover a more 
realistic moral psychology. It makes sense to think that «ultimately, even the most 
ardent anti-naturalist would admit that, at the very least, our moral theories must 
require us to carry out cognitive acts that are also possible for us to implement» 
(Casebeer, 2003: 43), and to wonder «what would be the point of norms that human 
beings were psychologically incapable of obeying?» (Appiah, 2008: 22). 
Several types of empirical investigations have been considered to provide 
relevant (if controversial) information on human moral psychology. Consider 
two well-known empirically informed models of moral judgment that allegedly 
challenge prevalent assumptions about moral thinking. On the basis of findings in 
neuroscience and evolutionary psychology, Jonathan Haidt proposes the “social 
intuitionist” model. According to social intuitionism, moral judgment is highly 
influenced by non-conscious systems, particularly quick, automatic intuitions 
shaped by both natural selection and culture. On this view, rather than using reason 
when making moral decisions, people tend to rationalize pre-ordained automatic 
reactions (Haidt, 2001; Haidt and Bjorklund, 2008). Haidt argues that moral 
judgment is significantly driven by emotional reactions, and reason functions to 
justify unreflective moral intuitions.
A second influential neuroscientifically informed theory on moral psychol-
ogy is an alternative dual process model of moral reasoning developed by Joshua 
Greene and colleagues (Greene 2008; Greene et al, 2008; Greene et al, 2004, 
Greene, 2001). Their model proposes two natural and different modes of moral 
thinking: one intuitive and the other more controlled and cognitive. Each is the 
result of two distinct psychological processes that operate in parallel and even 
interact in some contexts. Greene et al state that the hypothesis that such a dual 
process of moral thinking is at work is further confirmed by scientific evidence 
resulting from fMRI that shows conflicting emotional and cognitive subsystems 
associated with different brain regions. Greene advances that the more affective 
system is linked to deontological moral judgments, typically driven by «alarm 
bell» emotions designed to issue simple commands and dominate decisions, while 
consequentialist responses are linked to greater activity in brain structures that 
support higher cognition such as abstract reasoning, self-control, and working 
memory (Greene, 2008).10
10  This does not mean that it is unemotional (for the fMRI data shows that consequentialist judgments show more 
emotional activation than non-moral judgments) but rather that the emotions involved are apparently more 
subtle and ultimately overridden by the person. Greene makes a distinction between two kinds of  emotions, 
one that functions like alarm bells (designed to circumvent reasoning) and those that function like currency (and 
participate in the process of  practical reasoning (Greene, 2010).
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Both Haidt and Greene combine their views with the old philosophical debate 
over whether morality ought to be understood in terms of reason or emotion. 
Haidt thinks that his model presents a challenge to the prevalent understanding 
of moral judgment as an essentially rational enterprise only responsive to reasons, 
and more specifically Greene argues that his model shows that deontology, al-
legedly a rationalist ethical approach, is in fact not so but rather and «exercise in 
moral rationalization» (Greene, 2008). Hence the normative implications of the 
research.
Now, suppose that the science upon which they base their accounts is right. 
Let’s forget that Greene and Haidt seem to rely on a by now controversial dichoto-
my between reason and emotion and that each of them presents evidence to defend 
a different account of moral reasoning. Let’s assume that there is consensus on what 
model of moral reasoning to accept and that the accepted model shows that the 
moral psychology presupposed by, let’s say, the deontological approach is mistaken. 
Even if all of the above were the case, still it would not necessarily follow that the 
science has normative implications (unless we use the term loosely). Furthermore, 
if there was compelling scientific evidence showing that moral decision-making 
(including deontological decision-making) is inescapably emotional, then a moral 
approach that presupposes an overly rationalist moral psychology would have to be 
considered psychologically inadequate. But this does not necessarily discredit the ethical 
view in question. That an account is psychologically implausible does not necessarily 
mean that it is morally illegitimate but rather that the moral psychology the approach 
takes as a starting point needs to be revised (Timmons, 2008).11 At least in theory, 
the moral point of an ethical approach could be saved once the moral psychology 
upon which they rest is revised. 12
So the second version of the claim about the normative import of neuroscience 
is plausible only insofar its limitations are understood. It seems reasonable to agree 
that together with evolutionary and psychological perspectives, neurocognitive 
work could reveal misconceptions and incoherencies in the psychological views 
presupposed by some theories. By uncovering and analyzing the neural and psy-
chological mechanisms underlying social and moral decision-making it could pre-
sent a welcome opportunity to reflect upon the psychological plausibility of those 
accounts. However, the empirical findings would not be playing a significant role 
in the normative discussion of what is right or wrong and what humans ought and 
ought not to do. 
11  Timmons believes that it is possible to conceive more psychologically realistic versions of  deontology that could 
accommodate emotional aspects without losing the main normative point.
12  For a discussion of  the moral psychology presupposed by virtue ethics see Doris (2002) and Harman (1999). For 
a defense of  virtue ethics see Appiah (2010).
37ARLEEN SALLES  On the normative implications of  social neuroscience
5. Interpretation III: Neuroscience and Normative Ethical Theories
A third interpretation of the claim suggests a more significant role for 
neuroscience: the power to contest and even help undermine specific moral 
approaches. According to this version of the claim, neuroscience can give us 
empirical information that can seriously challenge the moral authority of certain 
approaches.13 The idea is that if it can be shown that moral judgments have 
to do with how our brain is wired up and such wiring does not have a moral 
nature, then understanding the source of judgments should make us rethink our 
moral judgments, the moral norms we accept, and possibly our general moral 
commitments (Greene, 2008: 75).
I mentioned Greene’s dual process model before. In fact, for Greene, 
neuroscientific findings can do more than provide plausible accounts of moral 
agency: they can undermine the moral plausibility of some ethical approaches. For 
him, the case against rationalist deontology as a moral approach is implicit in the 
empirical material. He states that «what deontological moral philosophy really is, 
what it is essentially, is an attempt to produce rational justifications for emotionally 
driven moral judgments» (Greene, 2008: 39) and that «our distinctively deontological 
moral intuitions reflect the influence of morally irrelevant factors and are therefore 
unlikely to track the moral truth» (Greene, 2008: 70). In fact, his skepticism extends 
to other approaches that allegedly depend on emotional intuitions as well. He says, 
«Does that mean that all non-consequentialists need to rethink at least some of their 
moral commitments? I humbly suggest that the answer is “yes”» (Greene, 2008: 
75). Neuroscientific findings would be used as a trump card to show that non- 
consequentialist approaches are morally inadequate. 
Philosopher Peter Singer draws on Greene’s studies to argue that one of the 
most widely endorsed methods for conducting moral inquiry among philosophers, 
reflective equilibrium, is inherently problematic (Singer, 2005). He takes issue with 
this method’s appeal to intuitions as standards against which chosen principles are 
to be assessed. For Singer such moral intuitions are not the data that Rawls takes 
them to be; rather than taking them as starting points of analysis, they should be 
considered unreliable and potentially erroneous. 14 More recently, Neil Levy has 
pointed out that neuroscientific results can produce better ethical approaches 
and suggests that the task of distinguishing good from bad intuitions may require 
scientific knowledge (Levy, 2011:4). Like Greene, both Singer and Levy are open to 
the idea that neuroscientific advances could play an important role in the normative 
13  Note that this view does not naturalize ethics (as Churchland’s view does) but it says that science plays a key role 
in the normative discussion.
14  Singer ends up making a distinction between emotional and rational intuitions, the latter supposedly superior 
because he thinks they would not be the outcome of  our “evolutionary past.”
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discussion allowing us to distinguish morally relevant from morally irrelevant 
factors thus profoundly changing moral theorizing.
The suggestion that the knowledge resulting from the study of people’s brains 
can cast doubt on the moral plausibility of some approaches has been contested 
on a number of grounds. Some commentators acknowledge the normative 
importance of the data provided by Greene and thus accept that some intuitions 
are unreliable, but try to show that the Greene’s data does not count against all 
deontology, or against the method of reflective equilibrium (Timmons, 2008). 
Others in principle appear to admit the possible philosophical relevance of the 
empirical work but question the methodology and the empirical data provided by 
the studies. For example, some note that Greene’s scenarios do not necessarily 
pose a real conflict between consequentialism and non consequentialism and 
thus fail to provide a reason for arguing that consequentialist responses are more 
associated with controlled processing (Allman and Woodward, 2008; Kahane et 
al, 2010). Others wonder about Greene’s distinction between consequentialist and 
non-consequentialist judgment arguing that the distinction trivializes both positions 
and thus is misleading and even inaccurate (Kahane and Shackel, 2008; Kamm, 
2009; Dean, 2010) or note that the studies may be culturally biased and their results 
contestable (Levy, 2006). And yet others complain that Greene’s examples are 
highly unrealistic and hypothetical and thus, the intuitions that they generate are 
not necessarily worth considering (Allman and Woodward, 2008; Woodward and 
Allman, 2007).15 Important as they are, methodological concerns are beyond the 
scope of this paper.
My main interest is the following: let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that we 
have no methodological concerns, and that it makes sense to associate deontological 
judgments to automatic processing and consequentialist judgments to more 
controlled processing. Would the awareness of these associations undermine the 
moral plausibility of non-consequentialist approaches? Recently, philosopher Selim 
Berker has argued that it would not. According to Berker, the primary and «most 
promising line of argumentation» in Greene’s view is the idea that deontological 
moral intuitions are to be rejected because they are automatic responses that track 
morally irrelevant and contingent characteristics (Berker...). However, Berker notes 
that it is not obvious how the neuroscientific information can be used to determine 
the moral relevance or irrelevance of those intuitions without further metaethical 
and normative assumptions regarding what is morally relevant and what is not. 
Thus, Berker concludes that the best argument in support of Greene and Singer’s 
position does not depend on information provided by neuroscience but rather on 
a substantive normative view about what is morally relevant that is independent 
15  For a real life, at least equally shocking case one can focus on The Queen vs Dudley and Stevens, 14 Q.B.D 273 
(1884).
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from neuroscientific results (Berker, 2009; Kamm, 2009). Hence the normative 
irrelevance of neuroscience.16
In a recent piece, Greene agrees in that «the relevance of neuroscience is rather 
indirect and that it depends on further non-neuroscientific ideas and assumptions» 
(Greene, 2010).17 He even adds that the neuroscientific elements of his research 
are not essential to his normative argument (Greene, 2010).18 But shortly after, he 
states that «scientific information can do work, not merely by drawing our attention 
to instances in which our shared values apply, but by challenging values that not all 
of us share» (Greene, 2010), and that neuroscience can actually threaten the moral 
authority of some judgments.
As I interpret him, Greene is torn between two positions. One holds a stronger 
view on the ethical implications of neuroscience, where its role is crucial in the 
discussion over the moral plausibility of an approach. On this view, neuroscience 
becomes the trump card, its role not limited to giving us knowledge about our moral 
predispositions, emotions, innate tendencies and neurobiological and psychosocial 
processes, but also as a crucial one in the discussion over the moral plausibility of 
an approach. If this is true, science would be doing much more than just giving us 
supplementary information: it could also challenge our moral values and even erode 
some ways of doing ethics. Unfortunately, the issue of how neuroscience can play 
such a role needs more explanation and justification than Greene provides. 
The second position that at times he seems to endorse is more moderate, 
neuroscience’s significance limited to giving us knowledge about our moral 
predispositions, emotions, innate tendencies and neurobiological and psychosocial 
processes only. According to this position, neuroscience’s role is limited in content: 
it informs the normative discussion but it is not part of it. This second one is a 
reasonable view to hold, but it is less philosophically interesting than we think.
 
16  Berker accepts that neuroscience could potentially “give us clues for where to look when trying to characterize 
what sorts of  features out there in the world each moral faculty is responding to … note that, even here, the 
neuroscientific results play no role after we have the principles stating what sort of  features each faculty is 
responding to.” (Berker, 2009: 328) However, for him “the neuroscientific results play no role after we have the 
principles stating what sort of  features each faculty is responding to: …the argument for whether we should or 
should not discount the verdicts of  one of  those faculties proceeds entirely via armchair theorizing …”(Berker, 
2009: 328).
17  The same could be said of  Singer’s view. He states that “advances in our understanding of  ethics do not 
themselves directly imply any normative conclusions, but they undermine some conceptions of  doing ethics 
which themselves have normative conclusions.” Singer, 2005: 349.
18  The same could be said of  Singer’s view. He states that “advances in our understanding of  ethics do not 
themselves directly imply any normative conclusions, but they undermine some conceptions of  doing ethics 
which themselves have normative conclusions.” Singer, ibid, p. 349.
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6. Conclusion
My purpose has been to identify different interpretations of the claim that 
neuroscientific findings have normative import and the issues raised. I believe 
that when making the claim about the normative relevance of neuroscience, 
some neuroethicists mean to say that neuroscience plays a role in explaining 
the neurobiological origins of morality. Others want to argue that neuroscience 
can show the plausibility of some psychological portraits. And yet others that 
neuroscientific findings play a more important role, becoming an active participant 
in the normative discussion. 
It may be that part of the reason why many philosophers are still quite suspicious 
of the experimental turn in moral philosophy is that they are not too clear regarding 
exactly what it is being said about neuroscience’s ethical relevance and the autonomy 
of normativity. Due to the impressive advances in neuroscience in understanding 
moral reasoning and judgment, debates about this issue promise to become more 
and more common and possibly more heated. If we are to move forward and 
promote the kind of collaborative research needed we have to be clear about what 
each disputant is really claiming and why it is relevant. 
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